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When a bank or a credit union turns you down for a loan because your debt-to-income ratio is too high, can you turn
to total strangers to get the money? Yes, you can, and we are not talking about criminal acts. It's called peer-to-peer
(P2P) lending or social lending. Prosper was the first company to take the vision of social lending and convert it into
practice on the Internet in the United States, and it enjoyed fast growth after launch. Four years later, however, it is
facing old and new challenges, and its survival is on the line. This case depicts the opportunities and pressures
Prosper faced, its actions and reactions, and its future. Prosper has made and will make many important decisions,
and Prosper‘s successes and challenges are rich material to study.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A BORROWER STORY
Like many others, Lara Miller is a talented young woman with a passion for fashion. She had a plan to turn that
passion into a successful business. Her talent was recognized by the press and seventeen retail outlets, but Lara‘s
business plan faced an obstacle. Without a credit history or sufficient collateral, traditional financing through a bank
was difficult. The young designer and her small start-up faced a difficult challenge. ―Fortunately, a friend told me
about Prosper,‖ Lara says. Within minutes of visiting Prosper‘s peer-to-peer lending site, Lara posted her loan
request and, ―[i]t was amazing. I posted the loan, and almost immediately, I had 8 bids‖ (from stories on
Prosper.com). Total strangers bid on Lara‘s loan listing, and Lara‘s business was fueled to move forward. Over time,
Lara took out three loans with Prosper. As of this writing, Lara‘s design career and her store are prospering. Her
story is featured on Prosper‘s website, and Lara has a big smile on her face.
Jan (not the real name), another Prosper borrower, was introduced to a Prosper borrower group by her daughter.
The group leader gave Jan the advice she needed for her first loan request. She kept the listing simple and honest,
telling people who she was and what she needed the money for, and she requested $5000 to improve her financial
situation. She was contacted by a few potential lenders, who inquired about how she got into the financial difficulty
she was in and whether she was able to repay the money. As Jan recollected, the whole process was very
―personal‖ and she felt ―connected,‖ very different from her experience with a financial institution, where ―all they look
at is my credit score, how much I owe, and how much they are making. It‘s very cold that way, whereas [on]
Prosper… [I tell people] this is what I do, I am a single professional woman, and I have some grandkids, I want to
have a nice yard for them to play in.‖ As Jan watched on Prosper‘s website, strangers started to ―chip in‖ on her
listing, and then her loan was fully funded! With the money she got on Prosper, she paid off her high interest charge
cards, and the monthly payment she was carrying was lowered from over $500 to less than $300.
With Prosper, Jan said ―[It‘s] a lot more personal, rather than cold, institutional. ... It‘s very easy. I feel more
connected, these people are willing to lend a hand to me, taking a chance on people, very philanthropic, I like that
idea…. I felt more committed, people had taken a chance on me, loaned me money, in order for me to do this.‖ Jan
currently has two Prosper loans. She has paid off her high interest debts and put up a basketball court in her yard for
her grandchildren. She is on her way to pay back both loans, and she has less than $1000 left on her first loan.
―Prosper helped me to reach my dreams,‖ says Jan. This happy ending might lead to many more happy endings;
Jan said, ―I would like to be in a position eventually to be a lender, because I know how valuable that has been to
me. … I like the idea of philanthropy—somebody reaching out to help somebody else. ... [A lender] might have been
in that [similar] position, or a relative in that position, as long as they feel secure that this person is not trying to get
away with something, [they would like to help.]‖ That might be Prosper‘s dream—for people to reach out to help
others and to live their dreams and prosper!

II. P2P LENDING: A MARKETPLACE FOR LENDERS AND BORROWERS
Peer-to-peer lending, also referred to as people-to-people lending, person-to-person lending, or social lending, is
your lending and borrowing 2.0. Instead of applying for a loan from a bank or taking a cash advance from a credit
card company at their rate, on a P2P lending website you can post a loan listing with the interest rate you are
comfortable with, watch strangers declare the amount of money they'd like to fund your loan, and even watch the
interest rate bid down. When the loan is fully funded, the money gets transferred to your bank account, and you start
paying the loan back at the interest rate determined by the bids.
P2P lending is not new. The practice of lending money to family members or within communities dates back to
ancient times, long before the rise of any financial institutions. The emergence of the Internet, however, has revived
the concept; it allows P2P lending to go beyond the circle of friends, family, and community to reach a much larger
scale over the largest network in the world. Individuals register to become a lender, a borrower, or both.
As eBay and
Amazon have fundamentally
changed
retail industry
Prosper—The
eBay for Money
in the
Lending
2.0 by connecting buyers and sellers directly, P2P
lending marketplaces create an online platform to connect borrowers on the demand side and lenders on the supply
side. Traditional loans involving a financial institution, such as a bank or a credit union, may be referred to as
institution-to-people lending. In this model, financial institutions pool the money on the supply side (e.g., savings
accounts and other investment instruments) and lend it to a pool of borrowers on the demand side, and earn a profit
by charging fees and interest. In this traditional model, lenders do not have much say in the interest rate, nor do they
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have much control over who the money goes to or for what purpose. For instance, there is no way to know how a
bank uses the money deposited in a money market account or a certificate of deposit. Borrowers, on the other hand,
have little if any influence on the interest rate as evaluation instruments from traditional institutions often evaluate an
individual using few hard credit criteria (e.g., credit score, existing debts, income, job) to evaluate credit risk. Soft
information (such as relationships, emotional appeal, social connections) are rarely used by traditional financial
institutions. Also, borrowers with an unfavorable credit history often have a hard time getting a good interest rate or
even a loan at all from banks, and have to turn to payday loans or high interest credit cards. With P2P lending, the
traditional financial services middlemen are bypassed. A lender can choose the borrowers to finance directly, and a
1
borrower can affect lenders by leveraging his/her social capital. These social features are attractive to both
borrowers and lenders, and many of them have been well received.
Zopa, the oldest online P2P lending marketplace, was launched in the UK in December 2005, and Prosper, the
oldest online P2P lending marketplace in the U.S., in February 2006. Awareness of P2P lending has continued to
grow, and P2P lending marketplaces now exist in many different countries, with a few variations in form. P2P
lending marketplaces differ in several ways. Some focus on certain interest groups and the mechanism for interest
rate determination; others focus on student loans, loans to disabled people, or business loans for developing
countries. The two primary mechanisms for determining interest rates are auction style and credit-based fixed
interest rates. P2P lending marketplaces also differ by lenders‘ motivation to lend and the degree of separation
between lenders and borrowers [Wang et al., 2009]. A lender‘s motivation may range from profit to pure
philanthropy. Some lenders find P2P lending attractive because they can support the people in need while making
some money. The degree of separation between lenders and borrowers ranges from close relationship, such as
family, to stranger. Wang et al. [2009] provide an overview of P2P lending in the U.S., considering the motive for
lending and degree of separation among participants (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. P2P Lending Marketplaces in the U.S.

2

1

Social capital refers to the value of an individual's social connections. In a lending context, this could include group affiliations, endorsements by
other people, and emotional appeal through listing description.
2
The size of the oval representing each company reflects its cumulative loan volume, which cannot be compared directly as the time spans for
these companies differ due to the differences in their launch dates. Source of information with the timeframe in parentheses: Prosper (02/2006–
02/2010), Lending Club (05/2007–02/2010), Kiva (11/2005–02/2010), Virgin Money (10/2007–Q4/2009, discontinued 2010), Lend4Health
(06/2008–02/2010), LendingKarma (4/2009–02/2010). ZimpleMoney (12/2008; loan volume unknown). Fynanz, GreenNote from
http://www.wiseclerk.com/group-news/services-p2p-lending-companies-by-loan-volume-jan-09/.
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III. PROSPER: AMERICA'S FIRST ONLINE P2P LENDING MARKETPLACE
Chris Larsen's Vision
3

Chris Larsen, who co-founded E-Loan, Inc. in 1997, had an early vision of using the Internet as an ―online and
distributed‖ platform for loan access. The idea was to put the control in the hands of individuals and allow them to
play much more active roles in the whole process of lending and borrowing rather than accepting the terms dictated
by banks. ―You always need banking, but you don't need banks,‖ said Larsen. Whereas banks and credit unions
dictate the terms of lending, e.g., who gets the loans and at what price, P2P lending marketplaces ―put the tools in
the hands of everyone‖ and allow ordinary Americans to be the supplement of their own bank. And the result is a
much more positive experience on both the borrower side and the lender side. Larsen explains the advantages for
borrowers: ―[P2P lending] is such a radical change from the way you interact with the bank. On the borrower side,
you have the fundamental benefit of controlling the maximum rate you want to pay. You don‘t have to passively
accept what‘s dictated to you. You can try it on your own. You can say Look, I have a good story, I have a good
business, I‘m going try for this rate, if it does get funded, OK, if not I‘ll try for another one. Rather than, OK, here is
12 percent, 19 percent, 25 percent, whatever it is. This is much more control by the individuals on both sides.‖ For
lenders, the experiences are equally rewarding. Besides making a good return on the money they invest, they can
also feel good about using their money for good social reasons, for example, to help a business down the street.
Beside direct participation and control, Larsen anticipated that this distributed online platform would also financially
benefit both lenders and borrowers. The gap between the interest rates paid and charged by banks is massive. The
interest rates of 3-year CDs ranged from 3 percent to 5.5 percent from the 1990s to 2008, while the interest rates
charged by banks on credit cards were easily 12 percent or much higher. Payday loans charge much higher interest
rates, which can be upwards of 300 percent. For comparison, the average 3-year CD rate and average borrower
rates are listed in Table 1. Larsen anticipated P2P lending to benefit both borrowers and lenders because it was a
leaner operation than traditional financial institutions, as there are no physical branches and related infrastructure
[Tedeschi, 2006]. For the service they receive, borrowers and lenders pay a service fee equal to a specified
percentage of the principal.
Table 1: Average CD Rates and Borrower Rates on Prosper by Credit Grade
Year
2006
2007
2008
Average CD Rate 3 Year Term *
5.54%
5.55%
4.10%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For AA**
9.31%
9.70%
10.09%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For A**
11.24%
11.96%
13.40%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For B**
14.17%
14.47%
16.43%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For C**
16.89%
17.49%
18.82%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For D**
20.45%
20.37%
22.42%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For E**
24.31%
24.20%
29.00%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For HR**
24.26%
24.38%
29.57%
Average Prosper Borrower Rate For NC**
22.47%
22.46%
*Source: http://www.jumbocdinvestments.com/historicalcdrates.htm
**Source: Prosper Data
AA = best credit grade category, HR = worst credit grade category, NC = no credit
score (discontinued in 2007)

Official Launch in 2006
After a two-month testing period, Prosper launched in February 2006, with headquarters in San Francisco. Chris
Larsen brought his vision to reality and has been the CEO of America's first P2P lending marketplace since then.
One week after its official launch, Prosper had attracted lenders with a total of about $750,000 to lend [Tedeschi,
2006]. It also attracted the attention of the national media. That month, it was featured in news stories of top national
media, including Business Week, the New York Times, two sections of the Wall Street Journal, and the Economist.
In March 2006, it was featured on WCBS TV (New York), Yahoo! Finance, and CBS 5 News. In the first three years
after its launch, Prosper attracted more than 890,000 members and generated $179 million in 29,000 loans. Listing
and loan growths are displayed in Figure 2. As of February 2010, 138,074 borrowers had posted requests for loans,
28,164 borrowers had received loans, and 53,099 lenders had funded loans. On average, there were 18.5 bids per
listing (on average, 139 bids per realized loan).

3

A financial service company founded in 1997 to provide customers with access to mortgage loans over the Internet; an online loan broker.
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Figure 2. Listing and Loan Growth

How It Works
Only registered members can borrow or lend on Prosper. Although a member‘s identity remains anonymous to the
public, Prosper authenticates the identity of each member at registration by checking his/her social security number.
A bank account number, home address, and driver's license number (or state identification card number) are also
required at registration. Prosper obtains a potential borrower‘s credit score from a third party credit bureau
(Experian) and posts credit grades and historical credit information in the borrower‘s loan listing.
To borrow money, a borrower makes a loan listing, which specifies the amount of money requested (in 2009, $1,000
to $25,000) and the maximum interest rate the borrower is willing to pay (in 2009 up to 36 percent), subject to a
minimum interest rate based on Prosper‘s rating of the listing. The borrower must also provide information about
annual income, occupation, and employment status. The borrower also has the option to write a listing description,
which typically states the purpose of the loan and information about the borrower's financial situation. Prosper
determines a categorical label called ―Prosper Rating‖ (AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR), which corresponds to a risk rating
based on a proprietary risk model, to help lenders evaluate quickly the risk level for that borrower listing. Lenders
choose to bid on attractive loan listings with the amount of money they want to lend. They even compete on interest
rate if the money supplied outruns the requested amount. If a loan listing gets fully funded before the listing period
ends, a loan is generated, and the money transferred to the borrower‘s bank account. All loans are fixed rate,
unsecured, 3-year, fully amortizing loans with a simple interest rate.
Lenders can be a person or an institution. The lender must maintain funds sufficient for the bids they make in an
FDIC-insured non-interest bearing account at Wells Fargo Bank. All payments payable to the lender are deposited in
the funding account. Due to legal regulations, all loans are made to Prosper borrowers by WebBank, an FDICinsured Utah-chartered industrial bank and direct lender. WebBank issues, sells, and assigns the promissory notes
evidencing borrower loans to Prosper and to the Prosper lenders.
Lenders can invest on Prosper in three ways—bidding on loan listings manually, bidding on listings automatically by
setting a portfolio, and purchasing existing Notes held by other lenders. To bid on a listing manually, a lender
specifies the amount they want to lend and an interest rate equal to or less than the current auction yield percentage
for the listing. Lenders usually bid only a portion of the loan amount to reduce risk. Should the listing receive bids
totaling the full amount of the requested loan, lenders who have won the auction are obligated to purchase a ―Note‖
in the principal amount of their bid.
A second way to invest is to set up a portfolio plan and allow Prosper to bid automatically on listings that fit predefined criteria. For example, a lender can set a portfolio plan that bids on listings under $5,000 with Prosper
Ratings of AA and A and an estimated loss rate of less than 2 percent. A lender can set up as many portfolio plans
as desired and place any amount of funds to them. Prosper offers three ready-made portfolio plans with different risk
and return targets that can be used as is or modified. Portfolio plans save lenders time searching listings and help
risk management through diversification.
Lenders can also sell the Notes they hold or buy Notes held by other lenders using the Prosper Trading Platform.
Trading existing Notes increases liquidity, as lenders do not need to hold the Notes until they mature, making
investment on Prosper more appealing.
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IV. EN ROUTE TO BIG CHANGES
The innovative idea of borrowing from peers implemented on the Internet technology brings eminent changes and
benefits. P2P lending holds many promises, allowing easy access to loans by borrowers, offering an alternative
investment for lenders, and satisfying the human need for social embededness through social networking.
―[B]orrowers say they are able to get loans more quickly and with less paperwork than at a bank. And people with
good credit are able to lock in lower rates—often 8 percent to 12 percent—than they would otherwise have to pay on
credit cards or unsecured bank loans‖ [Kim, 2008]. The Internet allows Prosper to reach out to millions of lenders
and borrowers dispersed all over the country and give them self-service 24/7. Cutting out the intermediaries in the
banking system lowers cost, benefiting both the borrowers and lenders. Also, consumers obtain direct control over
the terms and conditions of their financial relationships [Anonymous, 2008].
Prosper gives its lenders the chance to adopt a very hands-on and micro-management investment strategy. A lender
with a small amount of funds, say $2500, can invest in 100 different borrowers, with $25 on each. A direct result of
the micro-management investment strategy is that lenders gain much more control over where their money goes, a
critical feature separating P2P lending from the traditional financial markets. P2P lenders can choose whether they
lend and to whom they lend, and they are actively doing so. Based on data collected from Prosper from 2006 to
2008, the average amount bid by lenders on individual loans was about $90, whereas each lender lent about $3000
in total on average. On average, each lender invested in about thirty-three different loans.
The social aspect of P2P lending is attractive to lenders and borrowers alike. For borrowers, seeing people lend a
hand for the cause that is so dear to you is encouraging and personal. Moreover, getting an e-mail from a lender
praising you for paying back on time is something warm that is missing from interactions with banks and credit
unions. For lenders, lending for a social cause is attractive because people feel good about using their money to
help someone in need, and on Prosper they know what the money is used for and they can make an investment
decision based on that. ―[R]ather than saying ‗which are purely social, purely financial,‘ I think the more typical idea
is that unlike institutions which are purely financial, I think what you get when we talk about a person is they want to
mostly get financial benefit. Of the lenders, 75 percent say their motivations are financial, and 25 percent say they
are social as well as financial. So that‘s very different from an institution. I think a person carries both of those with
them at all times. Just because of the nature of how individuals work, right? Individuals spend most of their time
working for money, but at the same time will stop and help somebody on the street who would need help. I think it‘s
the same thing here. I can make a good return, but I can also feel good about what I‘m doing‖ (Prosper executive).

V. A MARKETPLACE BUILT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Like other e-Commerce businesses, Prosper is built on information technology. The platform and capabilities built on
IT allow Prosper to differentiate itself from institutional lending. At Prosper, information technology provides critical
capabilities as a market maker and community builder.

IT as Market Maker
A fundamental function of a P2P lending marketplace is to provide a secure and efficient marketplace for borrowers
and lenders to trade. At Prosper, information technologies are used to create tools for transaction, informing, and
decision support. A series of fundamental transactions, such as authentication, account verification, credit reporting,
loan processing, funds transfer, and settlement, are based on information systems. In addition to providing
efficiency, these systems routinize processes as well as increase standardization, improve security, and cultivate
trust, which is critical to the long-term success in the marketplace.
Prosper also uses information technology to provide decision support capabilities to its lenders. For instance,
portfolio plans automate bidding as well as reduce investment risk through diversification. For hands-on lenders,
Prosper‘s information systems provide rich data about the loan listings and the borrowers, including their credit
histories and current financial status. Lenders can see what a loan is requested for, a borrower‘s delinquency history
and amount in the last seven years, his/her open credit lines, income range, employment status, and length of
employment. The database and advanced search on Prosper allow lenders to sift through thousands of loan listings
and borrower profiles to find those that meet their investment preferences. Lenders can also save a search to
preserve their criteria. Bidding tools such as a watch list and a funding forecast chart (which predicts how likely a
listing is to be fully funded) help lenders to place bids for promising listings. In December 2009, Prosper released
Prosper Mobile, a mobile version of the Prosper website exclusively for Prosper lenders. This service increases the
ubiquity of Prosper‘s service; lenders can access ―My Account‖ and the watch list, place bids, ask borrowers
questions, and transfer funds using a smart phone.
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IT as Community Builder
From the beginning, Prosper embraced the idea of leveraging the potential of social connections between its market
participants. ―We believe groups are at the heart of fostering a culture of responsible borrowers,‖ Chris Larsen was
quoted on paymentsnews.com [Anonymous, 2006]. The idea was simple: if borrowers and lenders are able to
connect with each other, the social bonds that form between them will encourage funding and responsible behavior
[Anonymous, 2008]. In developing countries, microcredit programs that utilize social connections have shown
4
success; Grameen Bank in Bangladesh gives small loans to poor people to help them improve their lives. Grameen
Bank uses a solidarity lending approach that relies on tightly knitted groups and group members encouraging each
other to repay the loan. The social connection between individuals (also called social capital) is the source Prosper
wants to leverage on its online platform as well. A group system, where borrowers were able to create and join
groups, was established from the beginning. Additional features were added to the group system to tweak the
system. In addition, forums, endorsements, friend networks, and blogs are social features that Prosper implemented
over the years to offer borrowers and lenders multiple venues to connect with each other. Some of these social
features were more successful than others, and Prosper learned many lessons about the upsides and downsides of
their design and effectiveness within its first three years.

VI. CHALLENGES AND PROSPER'S REACTIONS
Online P2P lending, as an innovative and new business model, carries challenges. The most prominent challenges
Prosper faces are default rates, regulatory requirements, and leveraging social capital. Prosper has had to adjust its
policies and strategies to respond.

Challenge for P2P Lending—Default Rates
The fundamental problem with lending money to complete strangers over the Internet is to get the money back. The
loans offered through Prosper are unsecured, in other words, if a borrower does not pay back, the lender will lose
the money. A lender may lose part of his/her investment even if the borrower pays back at the beginning. All prosper
loans are amortized loans over a 36-month payment period. This means that it can take a long time for a lender to
recover the nominal principal, opportunity cost excluded. For example, at an interest rate of 10, 20, and 30 percent,
it takes 31, 27, and 24 monthly payments respectively to recover the nominal principal. If a borrower is delinquent,
Prosper may sell the loan to a debt buyer, and the lenders receive a small portion of the loan, experiencing a loss.
A big unknown at the launch of Prosper was the expected delinquency rates of Prosper‘s loans. Lenders had to
estimate the default rates based on credit grade in order to select listings that had the potential to offer a positive
return-on-investment (ROI). Prosper initially used the historical average default rate by Experian to calculate
expected lender ROI. However, lenders soon realized that these historical data were not a good indicator of Prosper
loans and that the default rates on Prosper were higher than expected (see Table 2 and Figure 3).
Table 2: Default Rates for Prosper's First Year Loans
Prosper Credit Grade
Credit Score Range *

AA

A

B

C

D

E

760+

720–
759

680–
719

640–
769

600–
639

540–
599

Loans made from 2/13/2006 to 2/12/2007
Lender Rate (Annualized; before service fees)
Experian: Historical Average Default Rate **
Experian: Range (Default rate)

HR

NC
No
>539 Credit
Score
1633
141
23.6% 21.6%
13.9%
N/A
15.1%28.2%
N/A
64.4% 69.5%
18.0% 19.2%

661
609
792
1119
1222
1456
9.1% 11.0% 13.7% 16.5% 19.8% 23.5%
0.2%
0.9%
1.8%
3.3%
6.2%
9.1%
0.0%- 0.7%- 1.6%- 2.9%- 5.4%- 9.1%0.4%
1.1%
2.1%
3.7%
7.2% 11.8%
Prosper: Default Rat ***
9.7% 18.6% 24.5% 32.7% 36.3% 48.9%
Prosper: Default Rate (Annualized)
3.1%
5.8%
7.6%
9.9% 10.9% 14.2%
SM
* In effect from 2/13/2006 to 2/12/2007; Credit Scores are based on Experian Scorex PLUS .
** Experian historical average default rates by credit grade for borrowers with less than 20 percent debt-to-income
ratio (Source: Prosper cited in http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/investing/20061006a3.asp.)
*** Default rates as of Feb 2010 for loans made between 2/13/2006 and 2/12/2007

4

Grameen bank: http://www.grameen-info.org/
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Figure 3. Delinquency Rates by Credit Grade and Loan Length

5

Controlling Default Rates
―Ultimately,‖ said a Prosper executive, ―part of the challenge of our business is that certain borrowers are going to
default. This is just a fact of life. They get into trouble, whatever it is. It doesn‘t mean they intended to do this from
the get-go, but it is just a fact of life. And so what we want to do is help our lenders price for that risk and price the
risk in correctly‖ (Prosper executive). High default rates are bad for lenders, borrowers, and Prosper alike because
they decrease lender‘s ROI. Prosper‘s selling point to lenders is that P2P loans are an alternative investment
instrument. So, the main challenge for lenders is to select listings with a high expectancy of repayment and for
Prosper to help lenders to do so. This leads to several policy and strategy changes to decrease default rates and
help lenders assess risks better.


Changes in Risk Ratings and Minimum Credit Score Requirements for Borrowers
At launch, Prosper assigned a credit grade to listings to help lenders evaluate the credit risk based on the
past performance of the borrower. This credit grade was calculated based on the credit score obtained from
Experian‘s credit report. The credit categories and corresponding credit score range are shown in Table 2.
In February 2007, Prosper changed its policy and excluded borrowers in the NC (No Credit) category and
allowed only borrowers with a credit score of 520 or higher to apply for a loan. In July 2009, Prosper raised
the minimum credit score further from 520 to 640. In addition, Prosper introduced the ―Prosper Rating,‖ a
custom risk model that does not rely on external credit data but uses historical data from Prosper to assess
the risks of borrower listings.



Changes in Minimum Interest Rate and Minimum Bid Size
With auction-based bidding, interest rates can be bid down if multiple lenders want to participate in a loan.
This may lead to situations where lenders would bid the interest rates down to lower than what sensible risk
assessments would suggest. Prosper introduced a hard bid floor in July 2009. The bid floor is the minimum
rate a lender can bid on a listing. A Prosper executive comments about the implementation of more controls
to provide more safety in the business model: ―So, for example, we allow open option bidding, but we do
give a bid floor so that prevents someone from bidding well below what the very minimum risk return would
be.‖ In addition, Prosper encourages lenders to diversify their loan portfolio and make small bids on many

5

Delinquency rates include late, default, and charged off loans; all loans originated from 2/13/2006 to 10/15/2008, and delinquency status is as of
February 2010.
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borrowers, so that loan defaults do not lead to over-proportional losses. In July 2009, the minimum bid was
lowered from $50 to $25 to increase diversification.


Leveraging Social Capital to Reduce Default Rates
In the age of Web 2.0, Prosper embraced the idea of leveraging a borrower‘s social connections (i.e., social
capital) to help funding a loan, lowering interest rates on loans, and decreasing default rates. This led to the
introduction of several social features, including a group system, endorsements, and friend networks.



Providing Borrower Information
Borrower information is important for lenders to assess a borrower‘s credit risk. Prosper disclosed that
between September 1, 2007, and August 31, 2008, self-reported information on borrower employment and
income was verified only for approximately 23 percent of all borrower listings that had bids totaling 70
percent or more of the requested loan amount (3,486 out of 15,436 listings). Only approximately 56 percent
(1,966 out of 3,486) of these borrowers undergoing verification during this period provided satisfactory
responses and received a loan [Prosper Prospectus 2009.7.13, p. 42]. Verification of all borrowers‘
information might lower default rates; however, it would increase Prosper‘s operation cost considerably.

Regulatory Challenges—SEC Regulation and the Quiet Period
Prosper entered a highly regulated industry with an innovative business model. Being the first company with a new
business model can create many challenges, and a legal strategy as part of the business model is required.
Overcoming regulatory problems emerged as one of the most influential challenges Prosper faced in its first four
years.
Lending activities are typically state regulated and require lending licenses. On Prosper, lenders do not directly lend
money to borrowers. Instead, lenders purchase ―promissory notes‖ issued by Prosper as portions of a loan. If these
Notes are securities, then they need to be registered with and regulated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Before launch, Prosper worked with counselors on this issue to bypass this regulatory hurdle.
Prosper‘s position was that the Notes issued by Prosper were not securities and therefore did not need to be
registered with the SEC. In October 2007, Prosper applied with SEC to open a secondary market that would allow
6
lenders to trade Notes with each other. During the approval process, the marketplace had to enter a ―quiet period‖
during which all new lending operations were suspended and only existing loans were served. Prosper‘s quiet period
started on October 15, 2008.
However, on November 24, 2008 Prosper received a cease and desist letter from the SEC. It was found that
Prosper ―from approximately January 2006 through October 14, 2008, violated Sections 5(a) and (c) of the
Securities Act, which prohibit the offer or sale of securities without an effective registration statement or a valid
7
exemption from registration.‖ The Notes that Prosper issued have to be regarded as securities and thus need to be
overseen by the SEC. SEC prohibited Prosper from issuing Notes until it registered with the SEC. Except for a short
re-open and re-close in the state of California, Prosper couldn‘t continue its operation for nine months until it
received SEC approval in July 2009.
Prosper grew fast and substantially over its first three years, but being forced to halt for nine months after three
years‘ of operation was traumatizing. Uncertainties surrounding the legal status of Notes led to confusion of
borrowers and lenders and reduced trust. What is more, just before Prosper started its nine-month long quiet period,
its major competitor, Lending Club, received SEC approval and emerged from its own six-month quiet period.
Lending Club, launched in May 2007, applied for SEC approval within a year before its business grew too big. The
timing of its return to the market was superb, as Prosper could not offer any new loans at that time, leaving it the
only service provider for nine months.

The Challenge Designing Social Networks
The Prosper Group System
Chris Larsen stated in 2006: ―Credit markets have destroyed the sense of commitment and shame if you don‘t pay.
... So we try to make sure buyers are tightly associated with a group whose reputation is directly impacted by one
person not paying. That should dramatically lower default costs‖ [Hof, 2006].

6
7

The Prospectus can be found at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416265/000110465907078072/a07-27421_1s1.htm.
The Cease and Desist Letter from the SEC can be found at: http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/33-8984.pdf.
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Prosper experimented with different tools to allow borrowers and lenders to connect with each other and to allow
Prosper to connect with its customers. Prosper introduced a group system for its borrowers and lenders. Each group
was led by a group leader, usually its founder. When a borrower joined a group, the leader had the option to review
the listing, receive more details about the borrower from Prosper, or confirm borrower information by requesting
more information directly from the borrower, a process called vetting. Lenders were also able to join groups to show
their support for the group. Each group received a star rating based on the collective loan performance of the group
members. The star rating would increase if the group beat a particular default rate and decrease if the group
underperformed. The star rating allowed differentiation between good and bad groups. Prosper expected the group
system to help by:







Lowering late payments and default rates as
o Borrowers feel obligated to the group and repay loan in order to keep up the reputation of a group
[Hogg, 1993].
o Group members discipline members who cheat, do not pay a loan, or harm the group in any other ways.
o Group leaders filter potential borrowers, select high-quality borrowers, and confirm borrower information
by requesting additional information from borrowers.
Signaling credibility, increasing funding chances, and lowering interest rates as
o Lenders prefer borrowers who belong to a group, because they expect group members to be less
delinquent due to group pressure.
o More bids lead to increased funding chances (see Figure 4) and lower interest rates.
o A bid from the group leader is expected to further signal credibility.
Encouraging borrowers to access the collective knowledge of a group as
o Group members consult and help each other, for example, by reviewing the listing and giving tips on
how to improve it (see Jan‘s story at the beginning of the case).
Attracting new borrowers and lenders as
o Group leaders receive a group leader reward (0.5 percent to 4 percent) on each successful loan and
are motivated to bring in borrowers from outside and build strong groups. Strong groups with low
default rates would bring in lenders.

Figure 4. Funding Rates for Listings with and without Group Membership by Month
Problems with the Prosper Group System
Unfortunately, Prosper discovered that the benefits of Grameen Bank‘s solidarity lending using off-line—often
closely knitted—groups was difficult to transfer to an electronic marketplace.
First, only in few instances did the groups have the spirit that Chris Larsen envisioned. A Prosper lender writes in an
open letter to Prosper: ―First, while there may be 1 or 2 groups out there somewhere in the 3600 Prosper groups that
actually have the dynamic [Chris Larsen, Prosper‘s CEO] envisioned, 99.9% of them do not. Most are groups of
people who don‘t know each other at all. No commitment. No shame‖ [Fred93, 2007]. Many borrowers never spoke
to their fellow group members but communicated only with the group leader. Without knowing each other, it was
difficult for the borrowers to develop a sense of community and responsibility toward their group. One borrower
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commented, ―I‘m not connected all the time…. It was a onetime connection. Once I got the loan ... I made my
payments [and did not stay connected].‖
Second, the group leader reward was created as compensation for vetting borrowers (performing the background
check) and recruiting group members. Instead, some group leaders tried to maximize their personal financial gains
by accepting and promoting borrowers regardless of their credibility. Some big groups (e.g., TwoMillionare debate)
allowed up to sixty listings per day—filtering, selecting, and reviewing all borrowers is next to impossible in these
cases. In addition, some groups used community payments (payments by the group in case a borrower does not
pay) to keep their group‘s rating artificially high to keep attracting lenders. This could skew the group rating system.
Lenders criticized these practices fiercely on Prosper‘s forum and on external forums and blogs such as
www.prosper.org. The delinquency rates of loans associated with groups support this resentment (see Figure 5).
Some group leaders also used the system for their personal gain. Lenders‘ portfolio plans might trigger automatic
bidding if a listing is funded to a certain percentage. Group leaders would place multiple bids on their group
members‘ listings to trigger lenders‘ portfolio plans, and they might even get outbid by subsequent bids. This
practice soured some lenders.
The hope that Prosper had for groups acquiring outside borrowers and lenders was not fulfilled. Many of the big
groups were not bringing in new borrowers from outside but were recruiting borrowers who already came to Prosper.

Figure 5. Delinquency Rates for Loans by Group Membership

8

The Decline of Prosper's Group System
Prosper implemented the group system from the start and tweaked it during the next one and a half years (e.g.,
introducing community payments in August 2006, adding group leader endorsements in September 2006). Groups
experienced their greatest success from mid-2006 to early 2007, with July 2006 having 65 percent of new listings
belonging to a group (see Figure 6). Groups became less and less attractive after the first quarter of September
2007. The decline of Prosper‘s group continued in September 2007 with the discontinuing of the group leader
reward. Many group leaders did not continue with the groups because of the lack of incentive. The group system
was not revived after Prosper‘s quiet period and had not played a major role as of February 2010. Instead, the
endorsement and friend system grew significantly.
A Prosper executive evaluates the success of the groups: ―Early on we were really excited about groups. It felt like
the right way to bring in the social bonding, and get better payback rates and things like that. I think due to some
implementation details, it didn‘t work out quite as well as we had hoped. ... I‘d say we are trying to figure out what‘s
the next step with those. How to get them to function the way we want. It‘s very hard to pull in the right group
leaders. We phased out the group leader rewards because we felt it was driving the wrong behavior. So all along it
has been a challenge to find out what‘s going to drive the right behavior and make them work correctly. ... We are
still working at it. It hasn‘t been an unqualified success, nor has it been a complete failure‖ (Prosper executive).
8

Loans originated from 2/2006 to 10/2008; delinquency status as of Feb 2010; month shows the month the loan originated in.
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Figure 6. Percentage of Listings with Group Memberships
Endorsement and Friends
Endorsements were introduced in September 2006 to allow group leaders to endorse borrowers and write
recommendations. In February 2007, this feature was expanded to allow other Prosper members to endorse
borrowers. Furthermore, borrowers are able to add other Prosper members as ―friends‖ to show that they have a
connection within the Prosper community. Prosper also displays whether endorsement givers or friends have placed
a bid on the related listing. Both endorsements and friends are expected to help lenders identify high quality listings
as well as give borrowers higher social pressure and incentive to pay back their loans. Endorsements and friends
are shown to have positive influences on funding chances and loan payment, although the results are mixed
[Greiner and Wang, 2009; Lin et al., 2009].
Prosper Forums, Blog, and Websites
Borrowers and lenders had the opportunity to communicate with each other in forums organized by Prosper. These
forums included a special corner for lenders, borrowers, and group leaders where topics interesting to groups were
discussed. For example, in the borrower forums, new and potential borrowers could ask for help and information
about how to write a listing, introduce themselves to lenders, and promote their own listings. These thriving forums
were an important source of information for Prosper members. However, the forums were also a platform for
criticism of individual borrowers, lenders, groups, or Prosper. Some topics were heavily discussed and both positive
and negative opinions were voiced. In March 2007, Prosper locked several threads (many of them critical of a large
group) and banned from the forums users who were identified as being in violation of forum policies. In November
2007 the forums were deleted and replaced with a forum where contributions were moderated by Prosper
9
employees. As a reaction, many former Prosper forum participants switched to third-party forums (e.g.,
www.prosper.org) and blogs in order to continue non-moderated discussion about Prosper. The official Prosper
forum was discontinued in December 2009 due to lack of activity.
Prosper has used other venues for social networking. Prosper started a blog (http://blog.prosper.com/) in December
2007 that gives advice to borrowers and lenders, reports on important changes at Prosper, and discusses important
topics in P2P lending. In March 2010, Prosper started a separate website called Talk Taboo where people can share
their financial stories and learn about debt consolidation. So far this website is targeted toward borrowers and
encourages P2P lending.

A Little More Safety, a Little Less Freedom
Initially, Prosper started with a wide open approach ―being a pure web 2.0 company‖ (Prosper executive). Later on,
the model shifted to include ―a little more safety, a little less freedom, than where Web 2.0 started in [20]04/[20]05.
… You need as much freedom as you can get, but you also need to have control‖ (Prosper executive). The shift in
strategy required changes and support on the technology side. Most of the information systems were developed inhouse, and only few third-party software packages were used. The system introduced at launch in February 2006
9

An archive of the official forum before November 2007 can be viewed at http://www.prosperreport.com/.
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has been tweaked and changed repeatedly. New features were added and existing features were improved or
changed as a result of feedback from users and requirements from the business environment. Many changes were
the results of abuse of the system, and unintended consequences. For example, initially, members were allowed to
add as many bank accounts as they wanted. This was thought a nice service for lenders and borrowers, to be able
to pay or receive money from different sources. However, some members were using Prosper as a cheap way to
move money between accounts. On realizing this system abuse, Prosper limited the default number of bank
accounts to one primary bank account. Some members were abusing the e-mail system and sending unsolicited emails that were not Prosper related to other users. Prosper‘s system had to change to add more control to stop this
from happening. In a marketplace where participants remained largely anonymous, fraud detection was a
technological challenge as well. To facilitate fraud investigation, IP addresses were recorded, and the Prosper
system was integrated with a third-party system to do external checks on members.

VII. THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE OF PROSPER
Prosper entered an established financial industry with its idea of circumventing the middleman—an idea that could
threaten established players if the idea proved successful. Competitive forces for Prosper come from two different
directions: traditional financial institutions such as banks and credit companies, and other existing and future P2P
lending companies.

Competition from Traditional Banks and Credit Companies
Prosper sees credit companies as their main current competitor. ―The competitors have changed so radically with
the financial collapse, and it hasn‘t returned anything close to normal. But still, we would say, the traditional credit
card companies are really our biggest competitor. This is really the way small business lending has happened in
main street America‖ (Prosper executive).
Prosper differentiates itself from traditional financial institutions by not being the grantor of credit but rather providing
the infrastructure to individuals who will then price and grant credit. A Prosper executive draws the analogy between
a retailer and eBay: ―The way we work is that we just give the tool to people who can decide on their own who is
going to get the credit at what price. So that‘s what we define as infrastructure; there is no central grantor of a price
or credit. It‘s a broad distributed market that uses our infrastructure. ... Think about eBay. They don‘t decide how
much their items will be sold for; they just provide the tools to allow them to be sold.‖
Banks operate on a spread base. They pool money from individuals (lenders) who deposit money for a certain
percentage rate and then grant credit to other individuals (borrowers) for a higher percentage rate. Banks earn
money based on this spread. A Prosper executive expects P2P lending to fundamentally change the financial
industry because it gives lenders and borrowers the power to eliminate banks as the middleman: ―with P2P lending,
[individuals] can be the banker themselves. So, spread modeling banking should be dead soon.‖

Competition from Other P2P Lending Companies
In the U.S., Prosper and Lending Club are the major players in the for-profit P2P lending area. Whereas Prosper
deploys an auction-style lending process and lets the lenders decide the price of the credit, Lending Club sets a
fixed rate on loans. Prosper CEO identifies how Prosper differentiates itself from Lending Club: ―They have taken a
much more dictatorial view. We put them in the category of a credit company. Their management are the ones who
decide who gets credit at what price, rather than let the community do that. We don‘t think that‘s the right way to go.
... So, we are unique in our approach.‖ In addition to the auction-based style, Prosper claims that capturing and
monetizing the social capital of borrowers are the major differences from Lending Club. A Prosper executive
comments: ―[Prosper's] model uniquely has the ability to capture and more important monetize social [element]. If
you look at a bank, or even Lending Club, [they] are dictating credit and price. There is no way to value that social
[element]. Prosper is the first model where you can see the social, which could be community, friends, family, ... that
can now be valued by individuals who control the granting of credits and the price of the credit. So that‘s really the
breakout here.‖

Looking Forward: The Future of P2P Lending and Prosper
―I think [P2P lending] will have its place next to lending from banks because people are always anxious for new
avenues for credit. Ideas like the open market that we have could be really interesting as far as credit moves in the
U.S. or even around the world and level of involvement of individual investors. And on the borrowing side … that
‗Oh, I need to borrow money, well, one of my options is P2P lending‘ will expand. How rapidly is the big question‖
(Prosper executive).
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Prosper is still the largest P2P lending marketplace in the U.S. with almost $191 million of loans generated in its first
four years. As of March 2010, Lending Club almost reached the $100 million threshold. Prosper‘s advantage was its
early entry into the market in February 2006, one and half years before Lending Club. Lending activities prospered,
and the majority of the loans were made in its first three years of existence. Lending Club launched in May 2007 and
closed for SEC registration from April 2008 to October 2008. After Lending Club emerged from its quiet period,
Prosper was closed down for nine months for SEC registration. During this time, Prosper was not able to create new
loans. Lending Club grew and surpassed Prosper in terms of monthly loan origination amount (see Figure 7) and
reduced the gap in overall loan origination (see Figure 8). As of February 2010, Prosper has not been able to repeat
its success before the quiet period. Loan originations by month are still a fraction of what they were before the quiet
period and considerably lower than the loan originations of Lending Club. Currently, it is unclear whether Prosper
can recover from the quiet period and which of the two P2P lending marketplaces will play the bigger role. Another
round of competition for dominance in the United States‘ P2P lending market has begun.

Figure 7. Loan Origination Prosper and Lending Club by Month and Dollar Amount

Figure 8. Cumulative Loan Amounts by Month and Dollar Amount
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